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Vicious Cycle or Business Cycle?: Explaining Political Violence in Northern Ireland
After the Troubles
Abstract
There are currently two schools of thought that seek to explain the persistence of political violence in
Northern Ireland, one with a sociopolitical focus and the other with an economic focus. Expanding on
past economic theory, this paper utilizes several multiple regression models to test the applicability of the
economic school's relative deprivation theory in the fifteen years since the Troubles were formally ended
with the signing of the Good Friday Agreement. The basis of this theory is that as economic conditions
worsen in a given area, the number of acts of political violence should also increase. This study
specifically looked at the effects of a rising unemployment rate and its relationship to political violence.
While no such relationship could be observed, there was a statistically significant relationship between
Gross Domestic Household Income and the number of acts of political violence, which supports relative
deprivation theory. These findings imply that policymakers in Northern Ireland should focus their efforts
not on reducing the unemployment rate but rather on increasing the average level of income.

This article was also selected to be published in CrissCross, a publication featuring interdisciplinary
student research.
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VICIOUS CYCLE OR BUSINESS CYCLE?: EXPLAINING POLITICAL VIOLENCE IN
NORTHERN IRELAND AFTER THE TROUBLES

Lauren Burke

Abstract: Tbere aI. CIImntIY tivo

sebools oftbollgbt tbat seek to explain tbe persistence ofpolitical violence in
Nortbe", Irelant/, one Ivitb a sociopoliticalfoclls and tbe other Ivith an economicfoclls. Expanding on past economic
tbeary, this paper lItilizes several mllitiple ,.gmsion models to test tbe applicability ofthe economic school's reialive
deprivation theory in thefifteenyears since the Trolfbles Ivereforo/allY ettded Ivith tbe signing ofthe Good Friday
Agreement. Tbe basis ofthis theory is that as economic conditions Ivorsen in a given area, the llumber rfacts 0/
political violettc e shollld also increase. This stutjy specificallY looked at the efficts ofa lising II11"'pIOYlllet1t rate and its
relationship to political violmce. !l7bile 110 slfcb "lationship could be obsemet/, there IVas a statisticallY significant
relationship betlvml Gross DOlllestic HOllsebold II/conle and the nllmber ofacts ofpolitical violence, Ivhieb SIlPPOlts
"Iative deprivation theory. These findings ilIpIY that policymakers Iii Northem II.land should foclls their ejfiJlts not on
reducing the IlIlemplq;lJlle1lt rate bill ratber 011 increasiNg the average level cifincome.
INTRODUCTION
From 1969 to 1998, the ethnonationalist conflict in Northern Ireland called the Troubles
was "easily the most intense violent conflict in Europe."39 More than three thousand people lost
their lives and approximately three percent of the population sustained some form of physical
injury.4o Although the level of politically motivated violence has subsided considerably since the
signing of the Good Friday Agreement in 1998, it continues on a smaller scale to this day.
Building on past research on the connection between economic conditions and political
violence, the goal of this study was to determine whether or not the unemployment rate had an effect
on political violence in Northern Ireland in the fifteen-year period following the Good Friday
Agreement. Conventional wisdom seems to be that a reduction in the unemployment rate will lead
to a decrease in the level of political violence, and several prominent scholars and policymakers hold
this belief. In the wake of the Unionist protests that began last December in Belfast, determining
whether or not this perceived connection is supported by statistical evidence would allow the
government to pursue policies that hinder the growth of hostile movements.
This study utilized several multiple regression models controlling for various economic and
political factors in order to isolate the effects of the unemployment rate on political violence and
thereby test the hypothesis that as the unemployment rate increases, the number of politically
motivated acts of violence will also increase. None of the various regression models found a
significant correlation between the unemployment rate and the number of politically motivated acts
of violence in Northern Ireland. However, political violence did show a significant correlation with
one control variable: annual Gross Disposable Household Income (GDHI). This fInding suggests
that although unemployment is not a significant predictor of political violence, other factors
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impacting the economic health of the country do make a difference. The correlation between GDHI
and violence also lends support to the relative deprivation theory and suggests that further study of
the impact of other economic variables on political violence would be a worthwhile investment, both
for policymakers in the U.K. and for economic and political theorists in other post-industrialized
conflict areas.
ROOTS OF VIOLENCE: LANDLORDS, FENIANISM, AND THE BORDER QUESTION
Today, Northern Ireland is fairly evenly divided between the primarily Catholic Nationalists
and the primarily Protestant Loyalists. The term Nationalist has been used interchangeably with the
term Republican due to this group's desire to incorporate the six Northern Irish counties into the
current Republic of Ireland, thereby uniting the entire island of Ireland to form a thirty-two-county
Republic. On the other side of the conflict are the Loyalists, often called Unionists because they
wish to remain a part of the United Kingdom and are vehemently against the proposed change.
These mutually exclusive goals are deeply rooted in the groups' cultural, religious, and political
histories.
The Catholic minority in Northern Ireland, typically of native Irish descent, was for centuries
at a relative disadvantage compared to the Protestant majority, who often trace their ancestry back to
the British settlers who colonized the island. As the Tudors, and subsequently Oliver Cromwell,
attempted to impose the new Anglican Church upon their unwilling Irish subjects, they confiscated
land from Irish Catholics and reallocated it to loyal British Protestants.4! These new landlords
established large plantations and enforced discriminatory policies that barred Catholics from
participating in Parliament.42 The Great Potato Famine from 1845 to 1849 exacerbated tensions
between Catholic peasants and the mostly Protestant landlords:' who developed a reputation for
evicting or otherwise mistreating their starving tenants." The famine's legacy along with continued
denial of political power to Catholics made many view Great Britain as an unwelcome, imperialist
power. It was this perception that gave rise to Fenianism: the revolutionary, nationalist movement
aimed at achieving Irish independence.
More moderate, nonviolent political actors attempted to achieve autonomy by pushing for
Home Rule, a policy that would have allowed Ireland to have its own Parliament separate from
Westminster.45 The movement met its fiercest opposition in the heavily Protestant Ulster province,
which includes the six counties that today constitute Northern Ireland. It was out of this opposition

41

Toomey 2013
Holwell 1997
43 Feeney, "Parnellism and Home Rule"
44 Donnelly2011
45 Feeney, "Parnellism and Home Rule"
42

14 IRE S PUB Lie A

that the Unionist movement was born. 46 At the conclusion of the Anglo-Irish War, the six counties
of Northern Ireland were the only ones that established a Home Rule government; the rest of the
island was granted Free State status and, ultimately, independence.47
By intentionally partitioning Ireland in a manner that guaranteed a Protestant majority, the
British created conditions that generated conflict. While the new Irish Free State was overwhelmingly
Catholic and therefore protected the Catholics' rights, the Protestant majority in the North ensured
that the interests of the Catholic population were never sufficiently addressed and that systematic
discrimination against them continued.48 Unionists not only dominated the police force, the civil
service, and local government, but they also enjoyed job and housing options that were denied to
Catholics. This imbalance persisted until the 1960s, when Catholics inspired by the American Civil
Rights Movement attempted to draw attention to their struggles through participation in peaceful
protests. These protests evoked strong Unionist backlash and, to prevent violence, the government
banned all political demonstrations in an effort to prevent rioting. On October

5,

1968, Irish

Catholics defied one such ban in the city of Derry and were met with a violent response from the
Unionist-dominated Royal Ulster Constabulary.4' This highly publicized incident is considered by
many to be the starting date of what have been euphemistically termed the Troubles. For the next
thirty years, Loyalist and Republican paramilitaries engaged in a "Dirty War" that claimed the lives of
more than three thousand people, most of them civilians. 50 Fighting between the major paramilitary
organizations was officially ended by the Good Friday Agreement of 1998, although radical splinter
groups continue to commit acts of political violence to this day. The focus of this study will be
determining which factors are driving the violent actions of these new organizations.
EXPLANATIONS FOR THE USE OF POLITICAL VIOLENCE

The Sociopolitical Explanation
Social science explanations for political violence in Northern Ireland fall into two main
schools of thought: the sociopolitical explanation and the economic explanation. The sociopolitical
explanation contends that political violence in Northern Ireland occurs because the two major
ethnonationalist groups in the region continue to view their interests as mutually exclusive. Although
they constitute a majority in Northern Ireland, the Unionists are in fact a minority on the island of
Ireland as a whole. According to incorporation theory,51 also known as the "see-sa\v" theory,52 each
group's minority status makes it feel insecure. As a result, each group tends to view the political

46 Feeney, "A Deepening Crisis"
47 Feeney, "Achieving Freed om: Ireland 1921-39"
48 Feeney, "Northern Ireland , 1920-98"
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advancement of the other as a threat to its own security and tries to assert its own power by
responding violendy to the enemy's political victories. Exposure to political violence leads to an
acceptance of violence ,vithin these communities, perpetuating a cycle of attacks and retributive
action that some expect to continue indefInitely.53 In essence, proponents of this view believe that
the only way to forge a lasting peace is by maintaining that peace for long enough that it becomes the
new norm.

The Ecollomic Explallatioll
The economic explanation seeks to refIne this belief in a never-ending cycle of violence and
argues that spikes in the level of paramilitary activity are correlated with economic conditions. One
of the most studied factors by proponents of this theory has been the unemployment rate. Northern
Ireland has suffered from relatively high unemployment compared to the rest of the United
Kingdom,54 and it is widely believed by both scholars and policymakers that unemployment is an
underlying cause of political violence.55 Proponents of this theory argue that the unemployed have a
tendency to blame society for their hardships and-more disturbingly-to express greater support
for "violent change" to the political system.56 However, others have found negative correlations
between unemployment rate and violence,57 attributed to the increased political apathy of the
unemployed58 or the increasing scarcity of resources available to terrorist organizations.59
The most relevant economic theories to the Northern Itish case are the relative deptivation
theory and the power-conflict variant of deprivation theory. Relative deptivation theory states that if
there is a "gap between expected and achieved welfare" for a population, they are likely to express
their frustration violendy.'O In the context of the Troubles, this theory would imply that the high
unemployment rate for all citizens led to an "equality of misery"61 that exacerbated the underlying
sociopolitical conflict and led to the Troubles.
Although results of studies working under this assumption failed to find any positive
correlation between the unemployment rate and violence,62 some scholars have argued that this
occurred because economic hardships were not equally distributed." In the 1970s, census data
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showed that the unemployment rate for Catholics was more than twice the rate for Protestants.64
Because the Catholics were economically worse off than the Protestant majority during the Troubles,
their comparative disadvantage may have driven them to participate in violent Republican
movements. This hypothesis reflects the "power-conflict" variant of deprivation theory,65 which
states that a group's absolute economic status is a less significant predictor of its likelihood to
respond violently than its economic status relative to other segments of the population. Empirical
studies of fluctuations in the unemployment rate during the Troubles found that higher
unemployment was positively correlated with acts of Republican paramilitary violence but not with
Loyalist violence," and although separate unemployment data for Catholics and Protestants is
unavailable, when these values are estimated, high Catholic unemployment was correlated with
increased Republican violenceP
Since the 1998 Good Friday Agreement, the socioeconomic gap between Catholics and
Protestants has narrowed considerably.68 Data from the 2011 Census show a 3 percent gap in the
unemployment rate of Protestants and Catholics,6'J suggesting that the anti-discrimination measures
of the Good Friday Agreement have in fact improved the employment prospects of members of the
Catholic community. The fact that political violence persists in Northern Ireland despite the
decreasing gap in the unemployment rates of these groups suggests that while the power-conflict
variant of deprivation theory might have explained political violence during the Troubles, it does not
explain the persistence of violence in the post-Good Friday Agreement period. If a correlation
between unemployment and violence persists as expected, this would suggest that the relative
deprivation theory, with its focus on the overall unemployment rate rather than on the unequal
treatment of Catholics and Protestants, would be applicable to this case. More broadly, this would
suggest that cohorts with an "equality of misery" are likely to engage in political violence.
EXPLAINING VIOLENCE AFTER THE GOOD FRIDAY AGREEMENT
While there is undoubtedly merit to the claim that acts of sectarian violence generate more
violence in response, the sociopolitical theory fails to address the immediate conditions that will be
most likely to ignite violent action and, consequently, leaves policymakers with few opportunities to
respond to the problem. In contrast, relative deprivation theory suggests that sectarian violence
occurs not because the groups are too different to peacefully coexist but rather because they are
experiencing a common problem. If high unemployment is truly the underlying cause of civil unrest,

Blackaby et a1. 2007
Maney 2005
Maney 2005; \'V'hite 1993
67 Honaker 2004
68Blackaby et al. 2007
69Beatty 2013

64

65
66

RES PUBLICA 117

then policymakers have a greater capacity to handle the problem or at the very least to pursue
policies that may help them do so.
The United Kingdom has been investing in projects to improve the economy of Northern
Ireland for years, believing that a reduction in unemployment would lead to a reduction in political
violence throughout the country.70 The focus of this research will be determining the extent to
which the unemployment rate has affected political violence in the fifteen years following the
Troubles. If a strong relationship between the variables can be determined, then the continuing
support for economic initiatives as political violence deterrents can be more readily justified. Based
on the narrowing unemployment gap between the ethnonationalist groups and the assumptions of
the relative deprivation theory, the following hypothesis was proposed: As the unemployment rate
increases, the number of politically motivated acts of violence will also increase.
RESEARCH DESIGN
In order to test this hypothesis, the present study utilized multiple regression models to
analyze statistics collected by the Northern Irish government. Quarterly unemployment data from
the Department of Enterprise, Trade and Investment of Northern Ireland was used to measure the
main independent variable, the unemployment rate. Because it is widely acknowledged that
participants in political violence tend to be young and male,7! separate regression equations were run
controlling for age and gender in order to determine whether or not unemployment for those
particular groups had an effect on the level of political violence. In order to rule out potential
intervening variables, the model also controlled for both Regional GDHI and political attitudes over
time. The measurement of political attitudes utilized three categories: Unionist, Nationalist, and
Other, Neither, or Don't Know, 72
The dependent variable, political violence, was measured using data collected by the Police
Service of Northern Ireland (pSNI). Specifically, this study utilized statistics taken from the PSNI
Security Situation report. I combined the total number of violent incidents per quarter in four
different categories of violent action into an aggregate total to get a clearer picture of how the level of
political violence varied over the fifteen-year period covered by the study. The categories included in
the aggregate measure are as follows: paramilitary style shootings, paramilitary style assaults, bombing
incidents related to the Security Situation, and shooting incidents related to the Security Situation. In
the time period included in this study, there were a total of 6,328 incidents. The use of this relatively
narrow definition of Security Situation-related violence rather than a broader study of sectarian crime

70 Hewitt 1984
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allowed me to ensure that the incidents studied had an underl)�ng political motivation and were not
purely acts of ethnic hatred.
DATA AND ANALYSIS
My results have led me to reject my hypothesis that the unemployment rate has an effect on
political violence in Northern Ireland. For every category that I analyzed-regardless of time lag,
age group, or gender controls-the unemployment rate did not have a significant relationship with
the level of political violence in Northern Ireland in the post-Good Friday Agreement period. The
consistency of these fmdings strongly refutes the possibility of a causal relationship between my
independent and dependent variables.
It is worth noting that the unemployment rate might not completely capture the
employment situation in Northern Ireland. The unemployment rate is a percentage equal to the
number of unemployed individuals divided by the number of workers participating in the labor
force. The labor force is the sum of employed and unemployed workers, not the total working-age
population. Therefore, the unemployment rate excludes so-called "discouraged workers"
individuals who have been unemployed for so long that they are no longer searching for work and
have dropped out of the labor force. It may well be that the long-term unemployed and
discouraged workers are more likely to have politically-motivated grievances and to act more
violently than those individuals who are included in the total unemployment rate. This is a
possibility that should be taken into account in future research on this matter.
Despite the absence of a relationship between political violence and the unemployment rate,
the relative deprivation theory still appears to hold true for the period under study. Another
economic indicator-Gross Domestic Household Income-showed a significant negative
correlation with political violence in each of the six models considered.73 The U.K. Office for
National Statistics defined the GDHI as "the amount of money left available \vithin the household
sector for spending or saving, after expenditure associated with income, for example, taxes and
social contributions, property ownership and provision for future pension income. It is calculated
gross of any deductions for capital consumption." The regression models used in this study
showed that as the total GDHI increases by £1 billion, the total number of Security Situation
related incidents decreased by between twenty-four and twenty-nine incidents, depending on the
other variables used in the model. Each of these correlations was statistically significant at the
0.001 level, indicating that there is an extremely small likelihood that the relationship occurred by

73 Significant

results are ind icated on the tables by und erlining. For all results, * ind icates that the result is
significant at the 0.10 level, ** ind icates that the result is significant at the 0.05 level, and *** ind icates that the
result is significant at the 0.001 level.

chance. While unemployment itself does not appear to influence the level of violence, income and
other economic factors almost certainly make a contribution.
Shifts in political beliefs also appear to be influencing the level of political violence in
Northern Ireland. In Model 3, which utilized a one-quarter unemployment rate lag, the results
indicated that a one percentage point increase in the number of people reporting a Unionist political
affiliation led to roughly nine fewer Security Situation incidents. Model 4 indicates an eight incident
increase for every one percentage point increase in the proportion of respondents identifying as
Nationalists and a fourteen incident increase for every one percentage point increase in the
proportion of those not affiliating with either party. The other models showed similar patterns.
These results are inconsistent with the idea that the political divide between Unionists and
Republicans is the cause of violence and the data show that an increase in nonaffiliated individuals
is a contributing factor.
While the increase in violence corresponding with an increase in the percentage of
respondents identifying as Republican-the group that has historically been involved in rebellious
activities-seems to make logical sense, the fact that an increase in Unionist affiliation leads to a
decrease in paramilitary violence is somewhat puzzling. It might be posited that Unionists are less
likely in the post-Good Friday Agreement period to participate in paramilitary acts of violence than
are Republicans, but the raw data refute this claim. Since 1998, Loyalists have been responsible for
685

of the 1,181 paramilitary style shootings reported in Northern Ireland through the final quarter

of 2012, compared to the 496 such shootings carried out by Republicans. With respect to
Paramilitary Style assaults, Loyalists were behind 948 of the
were responsible for
in the future.

464.

1,412

incidents, whereas Republicans

The cause of these discrepancies is a subject that deserves further study
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Regression Modell: Percent Unionist

M odI
e Summary
Model

R

R Sguare

Adjusted R
Square

Std. Error of
the Estimate

1

.698

.487

.443

55.82

Coefficients

(Constant)
Unemployment Rate All Persons
Total GDHI (£ Billions)
Political Beliefs Percent Other/
Neither/Don't Know
Political Beliefs: Percent Unionist

Unstandardized Coefficients
B
Std. Error
t

Sig.

808.57

250.04

3.23

.002

-10.40

8.66

-1.20

.236

-25.75***

6.84

-3.76

.000

5.06

5.22

.97

.337

-8.79**

4.09

-2.15

.037

Regression Model 2: Percent Nationalist

M0d eI
1

Summary

Model

R

R Sguare

Adjusted R
Sguare

Std. Error of
the Estimate

2

.688

.473

.428

56.57

Coefficients

(Constant)
Unemployment Rate All Persons
Total GDHI (£ Billions)
Political Beliefs Percent Other/
Neither/Don't Know
Percent Nationalist

Unstandardized Coefficients
t
B
Std. Error

Sig.

-43.19

227.18

-.19

.850

-9.53

8.81

-1.08

.285

6.85

-3.58

.001

12.84*

6.71

1.91

.062

7.99*

4.42

1.81

.077

-24.51***
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Regression Model 3: Percent Unionist, Lagged One Quarter Unemployment Rate

ModeI Summary
Model

R

R Square

Adjusted R
Square

Std. Error of
the Estimate

3

.710

.504

.461

55.45

Coefficients
Unstandarclized Coefficients
B
Std. Error
(Constant)
Lagged lQ Unemployment Rate
All Persons
Total GDHI (£ Billions)
Political Beliefs Percent Other/
Neither/Don't Know
Percent Unionist

t

Sig.

836.11

254.24

3.29

.002

-12.27

9.47

-1.30

.202

-27.77***

7.13

-3.90

.000

5.74

5.19

1.10

.275

-8.86**

4.05

-2.19

.034

Regression Model 4: Percent Nationalist, Lagged One Quarter Unemployment Rate

e Summary
Mo dI
Model

R

R Square

Adjusted R
Square

Std. Error of
the Estimate

4

.699

.489

.445

56.29

Coefficients

(Constant)
Lagged 1Q Unemployment Rate
All Persons
Total GDHI (£ Billions)
Political Beliefs Percent Other/
Neither/Don't Know
Percent Nationalist

Unstandardized Coefficients
Std. Error
B
t

Sig.

-21.38

223.83

-.10

.924

-11.56

9.71

-1.19

.240

-26.50***

7.17

-3.70

.001

13.59**

6.69

2.03

.048

8.02*

4.42

1.81

.076
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Regression ModelS: Percent Unionist, Lagged One Year Unemployment Rate

ModiS
e ummary
Model
5

R

R Square

Adjusted R
Square

Std. Error of
the Estimate

.737

.543

.501

54.48

Coefficients

(Constant)
Lagged lYear Unemployment
Rate All Persons
Total GDHI (j, Billions)
Political Beliefs Percent Other/
Neither/Don't Know
Percent Unionist

Unstandardized Coefficients
B
t
Std. Error

Sig.

739.58

236.12

3.13

.003

-6.34

10.19

-.62

.536

-28.50***

7.09

-4.02

.000

6.04

5.03

1.20

.236

-6.98*

3.72

-1.88

.067

Regression Model 6: Percent Nationalist, Lagged One Year Unemployment Rate

ModiS
e ummary
Model

R

R Square

Adjusted R
Square

Std. Error of
the Estimate

6

.725

.526

.481

55.53

Coefficients
Unstandardized Coefficients
B
T
Std. Error
(Constant)
Lagged lYear Unemployment
Rate All Persons
Total GDHI (j, Billions)
Political Beliefs Percent Other/
Neither/Don't Know
Percent Nationalist

Sig.

111.40

229.98

.48

.631

-6.77

10.40

-.65

.519

-27.53***

7.19

-3.83

.000

11.69*

5.82

2.01

.051

5.43

4.06

1.34

.187
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DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
The results of this study have important implications for policymakers not only on the
island of Ireland but also in other areas of intense ethnic conflict. The statistical insignificance of
the unemployment rate on political violence may suggest that if the u.K. and Irish governments'
priority is the reduction of violent activity, policies aimed at increasing household income would be
more effective than efforts that specifically target lowering the unemployment rate. However, if
further research indicates that persistent structural unemployment is related to political violence, this
finding would strengthen the argument for government initiatives aimed at educating and training
prospective workers. According to T.D. Joe McHugh, Chairman of the Joint Commitree on the
Implementation of the Good Friday Agreement, current economic approaches to decreasing
violence focus on funding grassroots programs combating youth unemployment. He stated in a
press release this past September, "We are acutely aware that education and employment
opportunities often elude many young people in Northern Ireland and the border region. As such, a
focus on funding to assist in informal and formal education is to be welcomed."74 While the data
fail to show any causal relationship between the unemployment rate and political violence,
policymakers continue to act under the assumption that the two are related. Although a reduction in
unemployment benefits society as a whole and is a worthwhile policy initiative, if both governments
intend to reduce political violence, it would appear that an alternative approach would be more
effective.
One alternative would be shifting the focus to policies promoting the growth of individuals'
household incomes. The strong negative correlation between GDHI and political violence provides
empirical evidence for the link between economic wellbeing and the level of political violence. This
in turn suggests that policies stressing economic development, particularly for communities, have
the potential to lower the rates of violence. Policymakers could use this evidence as justification for
their economic growth initiatives, which currently receive immense amounts of funding both from
the U.K. and the EU.
Notable among these initiatives is the EU Programme for Peace and Reconciliation in
Northern Ireland and the Border Region of Ireland (the PEACE Programme). In the proposed
2020 EU budget, €150 million was set aside to continue the PEACE Programme in addition to the
€50 million already earmarked by the U.K." According to EU Commissioner for Regional Policy
Johannes Hahn, the success of the PEACE Programme has already drawn the attention of Russia,
Palestine, the Balkans, Colombia, and South Korea, countries that are seeking effective

74
75
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reconciliation models.76 The evidence presented in this study suggests that such emulation has the
potential to be highly effective in reducing politically motivated violence. This is a possibility that
international economic organizations should consider when determining how to allocate
development funds.
As Northern Ireland continues to come to terms \vith its troubled past, preventing the
resurgence of ethnic violence will continue to be of the utmost importance. In light of the empirical
evidence of this study, there can be little doubt that the establishment of a solid economic
foundation is critical to the maintenance of peace not only in this region but in other conflict areas
as well. The need for the government to continue monitoring and promoting this stability should
not be underestimated. Though Northern Ireland has undoubtedly made iucredible progress in the
past fifteen years, the continued presence of paramilitary actors cautions agaiust the possibility of
complacency on this matter.

76

"Northern Ireland: The Peace Programme" 2013
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